Introduction
Russia and China may now be experiencing a pivotal moment in their post-Cold War relationship, which will determine whether they will shift from a non-committal partnership to a strategic alliance.
Being the two strongest powers on the Eurasian landmass, the state of the Russia -China relationship is of profound significance for the world's largest continent, and particularly for its Asian side, where Beijing displays growing ambitions.
The paper investigates the evolution of Russo-Chinese strategic relationship -from its beginnings in the mid-1990s to the present, focusing on the motives that have lately been driving Beijing and Moscow ever closer, above all their respective antagonisms with * This work was supported by Seoul National University, American Studies Institute.
Washington. It then goes on to assess possible implications that SinoRussian entente may have for Asian security order. In conclusion, three basic scenarios are outlined of possible future configurations in the Russia-China-US strategic triangle and their impact on the Asian balance of power.
(1) The beginning of the "strategic partnership"
In the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Sino-Russian relationship experienced a brief period of uncertainty.
The newly democratic Moscow was eager to join the West, to which it looked as the political and economic model. Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev were more than willing to act in lockstep with the United States, Western Europe, and the Western-led institutions. Understandably, this caused great concern in Beijing. For one, the collapse of the Soviet Union was viewed there as a serious blow to the communist ideology with potentially adversarial consequences for the CCP's rule. Beijing also feared that, with Russia joining the Western liberal camp, China's isolation in the wake of the Tiananmen events would become even more complete. The geopolitical triangle of Washington-BeijingMoscow, which China had so skillfully exploited since the early 1970s, threatened to reconfigure in such a radical way as to leave Beijing out in the cold facing the triumphant West. This would doom the PRC to the pariah status in international community.
To Chinese rulers' relief, these fears never materialized. The new
Kremlin inhabitants had no intention of antagonizing or alienating
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China, even for the sake of proving Russia's newfound democratic credentials. After a short pause, Boris Yeltsin continued Gorbachev's course aimed at improving relations with Beijing. 1) In December 1992, Yeltsin visited Beijing (with Jiang Zemin reciprocating in September 1994). By contrast, Yeltsin's maiden visit to Tokyo, which had been scheduled to take place ahead of China's trip, in September 1992, was abruptly cancelled by the Russian side because of the Kremlin's unwillingness to make concessions on the South Kuril Islands dispute, which the Japanese saw as the main item on the bilateral agenda. It was an early indication that China, not Japan, was going to be Russia's main friend in Asia.
The mid-1990s marked a watershed in Russia's foreign policy.
Russia began to feel bitter disappointment, and even anger, with the West. It was seen as treating Russia as a defeated adversary which could at best be a junior partner in the Western-dominated order. The list of major Russian grievances included NATO's eastern enlargement, lack of economic aid from the West, and refusal to grant Moscow its rightful place in the international system. Disenchantment with the West induced Moscow to seek closer ties with the PRC, which, for its part, was happy to embrace Russia. This was manifested in Yeltsin's visit to China in April 1996, during which the two sides stated their intention to develop "relations of an 1) That said, there were moments in the early 1990s when the Kremlin's chaotic decision-making put Russo-Chinese relations at risk. The most serious incident happened in 1992 when one of Yeltsin's trusted aides persuaded him to sign a decree allowing the opening of Taiwan's de facto embassy in Moscow, which was almost tantamount to recognizing Taipei. The scandalous decision was quickly reversed after protests from China backed by Russia's ministry of foreign affairs.
equal trustworthy partnership aimed at strategic partnership in the 21 st century" (Alexander Lukin "The Russian Approach" 148 Beijing were epitomized by a 30-year 400 billion USD mega deal to supply natural gas from Eastern Siberia to northeastern China, followed a few months later by another long-term agreement that would allow China to receive gas from Western Siberia (" Russia") .
Russia's threat perception: between the Occident and the Orient
It is certainly true that both Russia's governing elites and ordinary people are wary of China. During the past two centuries Russia was history. It appears that Russians have historically found ways of rationalizing any perceived risks from China. This stands in stark contrast to Russia's relationship with the West, which has been consistently demonized by most Russian regimes. Throughout Russian history it was the West rather than the East that was perceived as the gravest threat. This difference, Curanovic explains, could be partly attributed to the religious factor. Orthodox Christianity is regarded as one of the essential components of "Russianness". It is important that Orthodox Christianity has always emphasized differences between Russia, the sanctuary of the "true faith," and the renegade and apostate West, which is aggressively trying to destroy Russia and its identity (Curanovic) . China, which has no strong religious affiliation, has never been seen as a spiritual threat: natural resources…We have just finished the construction of an oil pipeline.
We are ready to build two gas pipelines. We will be supplying coal to them…China does not want to worsen relations with us to solve its current goals ("Highlights") .
The consensus in the Kremlin is that, in the foreseeable future The Western countries are keen to set Russia and China against each other.
They keep forcing on us this China threat notion. Yet we will never buy that (Remarks by Leonid Reshetnikov 2014) .
(1) The drivers of Sino-Russian alliance
Since its inception in the second half of the 1990s, Sino-Russian strategic partnership has received varying assessments. Until recently, prior to the Ukraine events, the dominant view has been that it is "an inherently limited partnership", which is imbalanced and fraught due to cultural barriers and the two countries' significantly divergent interests that are likely to diverge even more in the future (Lo; Kotkin) . Any idea of upgrading the partnership to the level of alliance has been rejected as unrealistic (Kuhrt) .
Yet, early on, there was also a dissenting view that saw Russo- …however attractive mineral resources of Eastern Siberia and the Far East could be in the contemporary world, the main struggle is not about them.
The main battle is for the world primacy, and in this we are not going to contend with China. In this China has other rivals. So let them deal with one another (Interview with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 2011).
Just two and a half years later, Putin's evaluation of the strategic partnership with China was palpably different: the sense of deliberate neutrality was gone. During his televised talk show -a highly scripted event with pre-arranged questions from the audience -he was asked if it was possible to formalize Russo-Chinese partnership 'as a military and political union.' After extolling the excellent state of the bilateral relations, Putin's response to the question was neither in the affirmative nor in the negative, which most probably was a subtle way of signaling that Moscow at the very least did not exclude entering into a more alliance-like relationship with China:
Speaking of our relations with China, they are progressing very successfully in terms of trust and collaboration, which are unprecedented… Generally, I think that the bloc mentality is a thing of the past. NATO was established as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Union's policy in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact was signed in response.
The Soviet Union ceased to exist, but NATO remains. We are told it is changing and becoming more of a political organisation. But Article 5 is still in effect, which is an article on mutual military support. Who does NATO act against? Why is it expanding towards our borders?
Are there plans to establish new blocs? I don't know; we haven't thought about this. But it is absolutely clear that we will be expanding collaboration with China. Our trade with the United States is 27.5 [billion], but trade with China is 87 billion, and it is growing. And experts will agree that China is gradually becoming the number one economic power. The question is when it will happen: in 15, 20 or 25 years. But everybody understands that it is inevitable…Therefore, we will certainly continue to develop relations with China. We have never had such trust-based relations in the military industry.
We began holding joint drills at sea and on land, in both China and the Russian Federation. This gives us reason to assume that Russian-Chinese relations will be a significant factor in global policy and will substantially
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A few months later, meeting with the head of the Chinese government, Li Keqiang, Putin stated that Russia and China were "natural partners and natural allies," using the word "ally" that Moscow had shunned before with respect to Beijing ("Putin") . China has attempted to build a series of relationships with other major powers that enhance its attractiveness as a partner while maximizing its own leverage and flexibility by not firmly aligning with any particular state or group of states. Rather than explicitly identifying friends and enemies among principal actors on the international scene, China sought to establish partnerships with each as a way of binding their interests to China's and reducing the likelihood that any would be able to cobble together a hostile coalition… (Goldstein 74) Goldstein goes on to point out the risk: Should China's relations with any of the major powers significantly deteriorate, especially if the international system does become truly multipolar, the remaining partnerships might be reinterpreted as de facto alliances (Goldstein 86).
China has not abandoned this neo-Bismarckian grand strategy as of yet, but its continuation looks much less certain than a decade ago. Thus the strategic value of the alliance will primarily lie in economic and diplomatic dimensions.
As a hot war between contemporary great powers is getting more and more problematic due to the enormous destructive force of The continental bloc concept is almost forgotten in the West, but is well known, and increasingly popular, within Russia's strategic community. 9) Some scholars already see the SCO as a 'Eurasian defense alliance' led by ). 
